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The scientific community often portrays science as a value-neutral enterprise that crisply
demarcates facts from personal value judgments. We argue that this depiction is
unrealistic and important to correct because science serves an important knowledge
generation function in all modern societies. Policymakers often turn to scientists
for sound advice, and it is important for the wellbeing of societies that science
delivers. Nevertheless, scientists are human beings and human beings find it difficult
to separate the epistemic functions of their judgments (accuracy) from the social-
economic functions (from career advancement to promoting moral-political causes
that “feel self-evidently right”). Drawing on a pluralistic social functionalist framework
that identifies five functionalist mindsets—people as intuitive scientists, economists,
politicians, prosecutors, and theologians—we consider how these mindsets are likely
to be expressed in the conduct of scientists. We also explore how the context of
policymaker advising is likely to activate or de-activate scientists’ social functionalist
mindsets. For instance, opportunities to advise policymakers can tempt scientists to
promote their ideological beliefs and values, even if advising also brings with it additional
accountability pressures. We end prescriptively with an appeal to scientists to be
more circumspect in characterizing their objectivity and honesty and to reject idealized
representations of scientific behavior that inaccurately portray scientists as value-neutral
virgins.
Keywords: value neutrality, scientific behavior, social functionalism, scientific advisors, policymakers
Policymakers seek scientific advice for a plurality of reasons. Sometimes, they seek accurate,
actionable information to guide their decisions, and call on scientists to act as honest information
brokers. At other times, policymakers might view advisors more as influence tools than information
brokers, wagering that the “right scientists” could help sway public opinion in favor of preferred
policy stances on controversial issues. To that end, they will seek advisors who have cachet
inside the scientific community and who share their ideological agenda. In most cases, however,
policymakers have mixed motives. They want to be honestly informed, but are ready to use
the tactics of motivated reasoning if presented with evidence that challenges their ideological
frameworks and preferred policy stances (Kunda, 1990). They may not be so ideologically
committed as to ignore overwhelming contradictory evidence, but neither are they likely to engage
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advisors with neutral priors. In short, policymakers face value
tradeoffs when they seek scientific advice.
In this essay, we examine the other side of the equation—
scientists as advisors, and in their everyday roles as researchers.
Our thesis, however, resembles our opening statement about
policymakers—namely, scientists’ motives are characterized by
value tradeoffs that shape their behavior. Yet, whereas it may
come as no surprise that policymakers may push their policy
agendas forward even if it means sacrificing some truth, there is
much cultural lore militating against this ascription to scientists.
We contend that attempts to hold the scientific community to
a pristine standard of value neutrality ring hollow upon closer
inspection. As scientists, we should aim to be objective about
the fact that none of us is 100% objective—and indeed honest
about the fact that none of us is 100% honest. We do not offer
this viewpoint as an exculpatory thesis for scientific wrongdoings.
Nor do we wish to diminish the importance of scientists’ advisory
roles, which we regard as of significant real and potential value.
Yet, we argue that a healthy dose of truth in scientific advertising
would help resolve glaring inconsistencies in scientific conduct
that challenge the coherence of the value-neutral narrative.
DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF VALUE
NEUTRALITY
What can a truth-seeking policymaker realistically expect from
scientific advisors? If we take the scientific community at its word,
the short answer is a lot. The scientific community presents its
members as dispassionate, value-neutral enterprisers dedicated to
advancing knowledge and to clearly demarcating where the facts
end and speculation begins (Mulkay, 1979; Gieryn, 1983, 1999).
Science is portrayed as above the political fray—and scientists
as non-partisan truth-seekers who know how to separate their
factual judgments from their value judgments—and who are
committed to doing so.
Scientists might concede that there is nothing wrong with
using value judgments to guide the application of science,
including personal decisions regarding when and how to assist
policymakers. Some might even argue that it would be ethically
irresponsible to try to duck such judgments. However, most
scientists believe that once an area of application is chosen, the
scientific process and the information gleaned from it should
be unaffected by personal values. Ideally, in this view, the
“doing” of science—from generating hypotheses to designing
research to evaluating hypotheses—should be value-neutral and
conform to Merton’s (1942) canonical CUDOS norms of science;
namely, Communism (openness and sharing of ideas and data),
Universality (inclusiveness and rejection of evaluating work
of other scientists on ideological or ethnic-racial grounds),
Disinterestedness (applying the same standards of evidence and
proof to one’s own theories and to rival theories), and Organized
Skepticism (subjecting all scientific claims, especially one’s own,
to critical scrutiny of peer review).
Scientists and policymakers alike surely realize there are
exceptions to the CUDOS norms, as when scientists are caught
having fabricated data. The scientific community’s reaction to
such cases, which couples surprise, outrage and scorn, suggests
that blatant misconduct is merely the work of a few bad
apples—flawed characters who never internalized scientists’
professional code of conduct. Yet evidence suggests otherwise.
For instance, a meta-analysis of studies examining unethical
research practices found that, on average, 2% of scientists
admitted to having personally committed egregious forms of
scientific misconduct—falsification, fabrication, or modification
of data—in their research, and 14% claimed they had observed
other researchers doing so (Fanelli, 2009). These figures are surely
conservative given strong incentives not to report misconduct,
especially one’s own. Barring extreme self-deception, it should
be more difficult to detect such misconduct in others’ research
than in one’s own. Thus, one might infer that 14% is close
to a minimum rate of the most serious forms of misconduct.
A rate so high simply cannot be meshed with the “few bad
apples” dispositional narrative. It should prompt policymakers
and the public to question the extent to which the advice they
are receiving from scientists is sound. And it should prompt
the scientific community to seek better explanations of scientific
behavior, including misconduct.
Although findings of misconduct and of the widespread
nature of improper methodological practices are now well
publicized (e.g., Ioannidis, 2005; Simmons et al., 2011), there
remains a need for a theoretical framework within which
these findings can be better understood. Without denying
the value of CUDOS norms, we question whether such a
normative framework–or indeed whether any framework that
might defensibly be called normative—can serve as an adequate
descriptive account of scientific behavior. We argue that the
normative-descriptive gap is wider than most scientists care to
admit or realize, and that a plausible descriptive account of
scientific behavior is needed.
TOWARD A PLURALISTIC SOCIAL
FUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNT OF
SCIENTIFIC BEHAVIOR
In sketching the outline of such an account, we draw on Tetlock’s
(2002) social functionalist framework, which stresses the plurality
of goals driving human behavior (see also Kunda, 1990; Alicke
et al., 2015). The framework acknowledges that two functionalist
metaphors have dominated the study of judgment and choice:
people as intuitive scientists and as intuitive economists. The
former posits the quest for truth to be a central goal guiding
human activity, whereas the latter posits that goal to be utility
maximization. Each metaphor has proven useful in stimulating
dynamic research programs in social science (e.g., attribution
theories in the former case and rational choice theories in the
latter case).
Nevertheless, the framework posits a need for an expanded
repertoire of social functionalist metaphors that permit
individuals to be described in pluralistic terms that capture
their central goals across a wide range of social contexts posing
different adaptive challenges. In particular, Tetlock (2002)
proposed three additional metaphors: people as intuitive
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politicians, prosecutors, and theologians. The intuitive politician
mindset is triggered when individuals experience accountability
pressure from important audiences. Such pressures trigger the
goal of maintaining a favorable social identity or promoting
one’s reputation to the relevant audiences. That goal, in turn,
triggers a range of behavioral strategies, such as pre-emptive
self-criticism or defensive bolstering, which are contingent on
the relation between the intuitive politician and his audience
(Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). In contrast, the intuitive prosecutor
mindset is prompted by the observer’s perception that societal
norm violators are plentiful and frequently go unpunished
(Tetlock et al., 2007). Whereas the intuitive politician responds
to accountability pressures by opening loopholes that increase
moral wiggle room, the intuitive prosecutor seeks to intensify
such pressures on others that close loopholes. For instance,
subjects assigned more blame to a cheater whose cheating
behavior caused a non-cheater to suffer a loss when cheating
was normative (i.e., many cheaters) than when cheating was
counter-normative (Alicke et al., 2011). The social functional
framework predicts that common social-norm violations should
trigger more extreme prosecutorial responses than occasional
violations because threats to control are more severe in the
former case. Finally, the intuitive-theologian mindset gives
intuitive prosecutors backbone: the prosecutorial mission is
not just to enforce social conventions but rather to protect
foundational community values—science’s sacred values (Tetlock
et al., 2000)—against secular encroachments, like scientists being
tempted to fake data for financial gain or worldly fame. An
important characteristic of the intuitive-theologian mindset is its
resistance to tradeoffs that in any way compromise sacred values.
For instance, people are much more likely to deny that some
benefit might be accrued by violating sacred values compared
to non-sacred values they merely oppose (Baron and Spranca,
1997).
Any adequate description of scientific behavior requires a
pluralistic brand of social functionalism because scientists, like
ordinary mortals, must balance cross-pressures and competing
goals. Pluralistic social functionalism offers a range of metaphors
sufficient to encode the goals, value tradeoffs, and behavioral
responses of actors and observers that arise within scientific
communities, bearing in mind that scientists will exhibit
individual differences in their goals and how they resolve goal
or value conflicts. It is thus useful to consider scientists from
the perspective of each of the five metaphorical mindsets.
The obvious starting point is the intuitive scientist who, as
noted earlier, is motivated by purely epistemic goals. This is
the scientist as the ideal Weberian type (Weber, 1904/1949,
1917/1949)—unwilling to inject value judgments into scientific
practice and, as an advisor, seeking only to use science to elucidate
the most effective means of realizing the policymaker’s stated
goals.
We may juxtapose that view against the scientist as intuitive
economist. Today’s scientists were once students who made
career choices among a range of feasible options given their
interests, aptitudes, and opportunities. As in any profession,
members quickly learn the profession’s incentive structures
and take steps to advance their material, reputational, and
even ideological interests within the ground rules. Therefore,
as intuitive economists, scientists are poised to engage a
repertoire of goal-advancement tactics, including the exploitation
of loopholes within their profession, which allow them to realize
their multiple self-interests. For instance, although scientists
become aware of the CUDOS norms (at least in spirit) early
in their careers, they might opt (or be advised by mentors) to
disregard the norm of Communism in favor of holding career-
advancing ideas or findings close to the chest until they are
published.
It is impossible, however, to obtain an accurate view of
scientists’ behavior without applying the mindset metaphors
interactively. For example, consider the mental calculus of
scientists as intuitive economists. In deciding how to advance
their interests, they must assess the likely reactions of colleagues
from the perspective of the intuitive politician. As members
of a professional community, scientists cannot ignore these
accountability pressures without consequences. We suspect
that a careful analysis of the tensions between the intuitive
economist and intuitive politician mindsets would help to explain
the frequency distribution of misdemeanor types in science.
That is, when the intuitive politician judges the reputational
risks of the intuitive economist’s pragmatic tactics to be low,
we expect a community-wide spike in such activity. Types
of normative infractions that are consensually ignored by
community members—the equivalent of jaywalking in any large
North American city—and which thus carry low anticipatory
accountability costs should be frequently observed with little
concealment effort. A scientist might be quite open about
not wanting to share exciting new findings before they are
published, while being unwilling to disclose the fact that they
selectively relegate studies to the proverbial file drawer. Yet,
where the scientific community incentivizes taboo practices,
such as selectively reporting results that are likely to entice
peer reviewers and editors or torturing the data until a
statistically significant finding gives itself up (Simonsohn et al.,
2014), we should see a rise in their prevalence, signaling
a shift toward cargo-cult science (Feynman, 1974). In fact,
selective reporting is more prevalent in scientific contexts that
strongly incentivize such practices (Fanelli, 2010, 2012), and
where opportunities for data manipulation flourish (Fanelli and
Ioannidis, 2013).
The preceding examples foreshadow the need for what
might seem the unlikeliest metaphorical contender for modeling
scientific behavior: the intuitive-theologian mindset. Science,
after all, is supposed to be the antithesis of dogma, and it
has over the last four centuries rolled back the authority
of theologians to explain the workings of the natural world.
Nevertheless, we argue that the scientific community is
dogmatically inculcated with a normative value system that,
among other things, teaches scientists to believe—or at
least act as if they believe—that they are engaged in a
value-neutral enterprise. Such beliefs, partly captured by
the CUDOS norms, amount to the community’s sacred
values, which serve multiple functions. First, and consistent
with the scientific community’s self-narrative, such values
support truth discoveries as an epistemic priority. Second,
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they help to unify the scientific community and contribute
to a shared sense of purpose or “collective consciousness”
as Durkheim (1893/2015) had put it. Third, they validate
scientific practices within the broader society and bolster the
community’s reputation much as the Hippocratic oath functions
in medicine. In effect, the norms serve as part of science’s
vocabulary of ideological self-description to the public (Mulkay,
1976), positively differentiating science from other knowledge-
generation societies (Gieryn, 1999).
Perhaps foremost among dogmatic claims in science’s
“secular theology” is the fact-value dichotomy. The philosophical
arguments for the claim that science is fact-laden and value-
neutral have been successfully refuted in stages, starting with
Quine’s (1951) attack on the dogmas of logical empiricism and
ending with Putnam’s (2002) pragmatist attack on the dichotomy
itself. Yet, from a descriptive viewpoint, we expect scientists
to continue to defend the dogma as an unassailable truth, and
we expect scientists to respond predictably to attacks on sacred
beliefs. Thus, attacks on the value-neutrality of science are likely
to be dismissed as unworthy of response and, if persistent, to
draw out sharp counterattacks, like ad hominem ridicule and
ostracism.
While intellectual attacks on science’s sacred values, we
predict, will trigger intuitive-theologian defense mechanisms,
self-interested violators of science who are caught doing things
that “give science a bad name” will activate their peers’
prosecutorial mindset. As noted earlier, the scientific community
responds to norm violators by characterizing them as a few
bad apples, thus obfuscating deeper structural problems that
incentivize unsanctionable norm violations in the first place. In
effect, the scientific community prosecutes members who fail to
ensure that their inner intuitive politicians keep their greedy,
inner intuitive economists adequately in check.
To sum up, our perspective on scientific behavior is that
there is no single, unadulterated “view from nowhere” in
science, to use Nagel’s (1986) phrase. Scientists inevitably
view their subject matter from multiple, difficult-to-reconcile
viewpoints. It would be wrong to conclude, however, that
we are trying to eradicate the narrative of scientists as truth
seekers. Although we reject a singular idealist narrative along
those lines, we likewise reject singular cynical narratives. For
instance, we reject portrayals of scientists as mere hucksters
peddling their latest epistemic wares. We argue that the challenge
for any adequate descriptive account of scientific behavior—
and indeed social behavior in any realm—is to resist the
simplistic appeal of characterizations that assign victory to a
single perspective. Our view is deeply pluralistic in the spirit
of Berlin (1990) who, following Kant, warned us to expect
no straight thing to be built from the crooked timber of
humanity.
SCIENTISTS IN THE ADVISORY
CONTEXT
The advisory context affects the scientist’s social functionalist
mindsets, but to varying degrees and in different respects.
For instance, the intuitive-scientist mindset will mainly
be affected in terms of its “flavor.” As advisors, scientists
maintain their epistemic goals, but because policymakers seek
practical advice and can care less about theory development
(Sunstein, 2015), the scientist’s epistemic focus—at the
insistence of the intuitive politician—will be tempered by
pragmatism (e.g., timeliness and relevance to the policymaker’s
concerns).
In comparison, the intuitive economist’s synapses are likely to
fire rapidly in response to opportunities to advise policymakers.
Such opportunities can yield extrinsic and intrinsic economic
benefits to advisors, such as lucrative consulting fees and
status. If the advising context is well matched to the advisor’s
ideological commitments, opportunities to influence power-
holders’ views on topics of value importance could also send
the advisor’s intuitive-theologian into a frenzied state. In such
cases, the scientist as intuitive-theologian is faced with balancing
commitments to competing sacred values, including those
of the scientific community. Unsurprisingly, in such battles,
the scientists’ personal values often win out, leading them
to adopt questionable interpretative practices favoring their
ideological commitments (Jussim et al., 2016). For example,
not only is there a prevalent liberal bias in social science, but
many social scientists admit they would discriminate against
colleagues who do not share their political views (Inbar and
Lammers, 2012; Duarte et al., 2015). One of the greatest costs
of ritualizing scientific values is that they will not be strongly
internalized, as work on value pluralism suggests (Tetlock,
1986).
Within the advisory context, the intuitive politician is bound
to work overtime. For academics plucked from their usual roles,
accountability pressures of advising policymakers will be less
familiar, prompting more effortful consideration of appropriate
response strategies. For instance, advisors may need to think
through the extent to which they will deliver advice in a fox-
like style, with large dollops of preemptive self-criticism, risking
appearing cowardly albeit balanced, or deliver advice in a more
decisive hedgehog-like style, risking appearing dogmatic albeit
decisive (Tetlock, 2005). The intuitive politician, however, faces
challenges that go well beyond those posed by the novelty of the
audience and which extend to ensuring that the temptations of
the intuitive economist and theologian mindsets are reasonably
kept in check.
WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US?
If the notion of value neutrality in science is a mythical holdover
from logical positivism (Putnam, 2002), and if a murky mix
of social-functionalist goals actually governs scientific conduct,
where does it leave us? In the end, we appeal to scientists to try
to be objective about our imperfect objectivity—and honest that
none of us is capable of being perfectly honest given the vying
mindsets that shape our goals. Such epistemic modesty is more
in keeping with the scientific spirit of non-dogmatic inquiry than
blind adherence to the sacred narrative of value-neutral virginity.
If done right, vanquishing the tenacious myth of value neutrality
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could make us truer to the values of science and more honest as
advisors. Yet, there is a risk that honesty about our non-epistemic
goals could be used to condone the very practices that harm
scientific integrity. Scientists must walk a fine line.
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